

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01832 032029Z

11
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 AEC-11 OMB-01 IO-14

OIC-04 DRC-01 /161 W
----- 070732

R 031900Z APR 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4994
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T USNATO 1832

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: FRG'S APRIL 1 STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 1797

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF FRG REP'S STATEMENT AT APRIL 1 SPC MEETING ON VERIFICATION (DETAILS REFTEL). STATEMENT RESPONDS TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS PUT TO FRG REP AT MARCH 25 SPC MEETING, BUT GOES ON TO RAISE FURTHER POINTS, INCLUDING THREE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO U.S. FRG WANTS TO KNOW A) POTENTIAL AND RELIABILITY OF U.S.-NTM FOR VERIFICATION IN MBFR; B) HOW ALLIES CAN ADEQUATELY PARTICIPATE; AND C) WHETHER U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE BELGIAN AND DUTCH PORTS FOR REDUCTIONS AND AUTHORIZED RE-ENTRY OF FORCES.

2. BEGIN TEXT

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01832 032029Z

SPEAKING NOTES

SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATIONS

I

1. WITH REGARD TO THE NETHERLANDS'S INTERVENTION OF THE 25TH OF MARCH MY AUTHORITIES POINT OUT THAT THEY ARE AWARE THAT MBFR EVEN WITHOUT VERIFICATION-MEASURES WILL CREATE CERTAIN "SPECIAL CONDITIONS" FOR THE AREA. CONCERNED (NGA). WITHOUT SUCH VERIFICATION - AND OTHER COLLATERAL MEASURES OTHER SPECIAL COMMITMENTS WOULD EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED COMMON CEILING. CONTRARY TO A COMMON CEILING, VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION IS LIKELY TO CREATE A ZONE OF CONTROLS AND GOES THUS QUALITATIVELY FAR BEYOND A COMMITMENT BY COMMON CEILING. IT IS OUR CONCERN TO LIMIT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF ANY "SPECIAL CONDITIONS" RESULTING FROM MBFR. THERFORE WE WANT TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS ONLY AS FAR AS THEY ARE REALLY NECESSARY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE BELGIAN INTERVENTION OF 25MARCH, MY AUTHORITIES STATE THAT THEY AGREE THAT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF VERIFICATION-MEASURES MUST BE WEIGHED ONE AGAINST THE OTHER. WE HAVE THEREFORE STRESSED THAT WE HAVE TO LOOK FOR BALANCED SOLUTIONS BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS ON THE ONE HAND AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY ON THE OTHER. FOR THE TIME BEING WE WOULD LIKE TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON THE I. PHASE. AS THINGS STAND WE CANNOT ACCEPT ANY PERMANENT INSPECTION TO COVER AREAS.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE DANISH INTERVENTION OF 25 MARCH MY AUTHORITIES THINK IT DESIRABLE TO EXTEND, IF POSSIBLE, THE AREA WITHIN WHICH COLLATERAL MEASURES ARE TO BE APPLIED. THUS, THE EFFECTS OF ANY "SPECIAL CONDITIONS" FOR THE NGA WOULD BE MITIGATED. VERIFICATION WOULD APPLY TO THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES AS WELL AS
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01832 032029Z

TO STABILIZING - AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES. WE DO NOT FAIL TO SEE, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD RESULT FOR THE WEST FROM THE NECESSARY RECIPROCITY.

II.

MY AUTHORITIES HAVE INSTRUCTED ME TO INTRODUCE THE FOLLOWING FURTHER THOUGHTS INTO THE DISCUSSION:

1. ON 12TH MARCH 1974 WE HAVE AGREED, FOR THE I. PHASE, TO SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT BY INSPECTIONS, LIMITED IN TIME. IT IS CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SUPERVISION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WHICH WE, TOO, THINK TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, HAS NOT YET FOUND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. IN THE OPINION OF MY AUTHORITIES IT WILL BE DECISIVE IN THIS CONTEXT TO LIMIT AND CONTROL MOVEMENTS INTO THE NGA.

2. TO ASSESS WHICH AGREED INSPECTIONS FOR POST-REDUCTION SUPERVISION COULD PERHAPS BE ACCEPTABLE, AN ANSWER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IS REQUIRED:

-HOW FAR CAN "MOVEMENTS INTO NGA" BE OBSERVED WITH SUFFICIENT RELABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS? (AS INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY MINIMUM BECAUSE OF THEIR POTENTIAL POLITICAL EFFECTS, MY AUTHORITIS ARE OF THE OPINION THAT WE HAVE FIRST TO KNOW THE VERIFICATION-POTENTIAL OF THE US-NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS - I.E. VERIFICATION BY SATELLITE. ONLY THEN CAN WE DECIDE TO WHAT EXTENT INSPECTIONS WILL BE NECESSARY*). THE VERIFICATION - POTENTIAL OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS GAVING GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL ALLIES CONCERNED, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KNOW HOW THE ALLIES CAN ADEQUATELY PARTICIPATE.

- IN OUR OPINION, VERIFICATION COULD BE FACILITATED IF A LIMITED NUMBER OF "POINTS OF DEPARTURE" FOR THE EXECUTION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS ARE AGREED AND IF LEGITIMATE RE-INTRODUCTION (ROTATION ETC.) COULD BE LIMITED TO THE SAME POINTS OF DEPARTURE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01832 032029Z

- MY AUTHORITIES HAVE NOTED THAT BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS CONSIDER THE INCLUSION OF THE PORTS OF ANTWERP AND ROTTERDAM INTO A VERIFICATION SYSTEM. IT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO KNOW WHETHER THE US INTEND TO UTILIZE THESE PORTS FOR REDUCTIONS AND RE-INTRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL-TRANSPORTS. IF THERE ARE TO BE A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXIT - RE-ENTRY POINTS WHICH, ON THE WESTERN SIDE MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO GERMAN TERRITORY, THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTIONS AT THESE POINTS COULD BE ENHANCED EVEN FOR THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD.

3. UNDER THE PRE-CONDITIONS SET OUT IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH IT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED HOW ILLEGAL RE-INTRODUCTION OF FORCES ALONG NON-AGRRED ROUTES, I.E. BY-PASSING THE AGREED EXIT - RE-ENTRY POINTS, COULD BE OBSERVED. AGAIN, THE QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE ANSWERED HOW EFFICIENTLY THIS CAN BE DONE BY NATIONAL MEANS. SHOULD NATIONAL MEANS NOT SUFFICE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED WHETHER SPOT-CHECKS FOLLOWING AN AGREED PROCEDURE COULD BE ENVISAGED. DETAILS OF THIS PROBLEM COULD PROBABLY BEST BE DISCUSSED IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP. IT HAS TO BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT MY AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TO INSIST AS "HOST COUNTRY" TO TAKE PART IN THE INSPECTION BY TEAMS, PARTICULARLY IN POSSIBLE SPOT-CHECKS.

END TEXT.
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO01832
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740482/abbryudu.tel
Line Count: 166
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 1797
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19-Jul-2001 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: FRG'S APRIL 1 STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

